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Abstract 
We assess differences that emerge in Taylor rule estimations for the Fed and the ECB before 
and after the start of the subprime crisis. For this purpose, we apply an explicit estimate of the 
equilibrium real interest rate and of potential output in order to account for variations within 
these variables over time. We argue that measures of money and credit growth, interest rate 
spreads and asset price inflation should be added to the classical Taylor rule because   
these variables are proxies of a change in the equilibrium interest rate and are, thus, also  
likely to have played a major role in setting policy rates during the crisis. 
Our empirical results gained from a state-space model and GMM estimations reveal that, as 
far as the Fed is concerned, the impact of consumer price inflation, and money and credit 
growth turns negative during the crisis while the sign of the asset price inflation coefficient 
turns positive. Thus we are able to establish significant differences in the parameters of the 
reaction functions of the Fed before and after the start of the subprime crisis. In case of the 
ECB, there is no evidence of a change in signs. Instead, the positive reaction to credit growth, 
consumer and house price inflation becomes even stronger than before. Moreover we find 
evidence of a less inertial policy of both the Fed and the ECB during the crisis. 
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  Since the start of the subprime crisis in August 2007, central banks all over the world 
have cut interest rates at a rapid pace trying to overcome the negative effects to the economy. 
Even  though  interest  rates  were  lowered  everywhere,  the  timing  of  the  cuts  differed 
considerably  among  central  banks.  The  probably  most  pronounced  difference  can  be 
established if one compares the monetary policies of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). While the Fed started to cut rates already in August 2007 the 
ECB did not lower the interest rate until October 2008.
1 At the time of writing, the Fed policy 
rates have reached their lower bound of 0 - 0.25% while the ECB has still some ample room 
to cut rates further since the policy rate currently amounts to one percent.
2 The different 
mandates of both central banks might be one explanation of these diverging policies. Whereas 
the goal of the ECB is to maintain price stability, the Fed also has to promote maximum 
employment and moderate long-term interest rates. So it does not come as a surprise that the 
Fed puts a larger weight on output stabilization than the ECB which, in turn, explains the 
more aggressive response of the Fed to the crisis.  
However, both central banks appear to have adjusted their policy with the beginning of 
the crisis. In this context, it becomes important to check empirically which factors were the 
driving  forces  behind  their  interest  rate  decisions.  Hence,  we  estimate  Taylor  reaction 
functions (i.e. Taylor rules (Taylor 1993)) for both central banks separately for the period 
before the start of the financial turmoil and the period thereafter in order to test whether there 
are significant differences in the response coefficients in both periods.
3 What is more, we 
include “additional” factors driving interest rate decisions in augmented Taylor rules and test 
                                                           
1 In fact, the ECB even increased the policy rate in 2008M7 in response to upcoming risks to price-stability 
(ECB (2008), p.5).   
2  Lowering  rates  might  probably  not  be  an  option  in  reality  since  the  ECB  already  started  its  exit  from 
unconventional monetary policies at its most recent council meeting on December 3rd, 2009. However, from an 
econometric perspective this might be an important precondition for a “balanced” estimation. 
3 It might be argued that using Taylor rules in this context might not be appropriate because during the crisis 
central banks have started to apply unconventional monetary policies. Thus, they did not confine themselves to 
target the short-term interest rate throughout our sample period as it is supposed by the Taylor rule. But we argue 
in line with Jobst (2009) that we need to distinguish between the adjustment of the liquidity implementation 
framework and the target of monetary policy. While there have been many programs to alter the implementation 
especially in the case of the Fed (see Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008 and 2009), there is up to date no 
clear evidence whether the target of the Fed has changed (for example to target inflation expectations in the 
presence of a zero nominal rate as Reis (2010) suggests it). Moreover, Aït-Sahalia et al. (2009) find in their 
analysis that interest rate policy within the crisis was able to reduce interest rate spreads while measures of 
unconventional monetary policy appear to play only a minor role. Thus, we feel legitimized to (still) use the 
interest rate as the dependent variable. - 1 - 
 
whether central banks get indeed less inertial within a crisis as proposed by Mishkin (2008 
and 2009). As “additional” explanatory variables and in the spirit of Tucker (2008) we insert 
different measures of credit and money growth, an interest rate spread variable and asset price 
inflation variables, the latter being represented by stock and real estate prices. We suspect 
some of these factors to have become more important during the crisis - for instance, because 
they might proxy some changes in the equilibrium interest rate - while the response to others 
is likely to have decreased.  
We decided to include an explicit measure of the equilibrium real interest rate in our 
Taylor rule estimate since this measure is also likely to have changed alongside the start of the 
crisis (see McCulley/Toloui (2008) and Tucker (2008)). That is exactly why we explicitly 
estimate  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate  using  the  state-space  approach  introduced  by 
Laubach/Williams (2003). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our 
approach to estimate the equilibrium real interest rate and present our empirical results. In 
section 3, we explain the Taylor rule framework, also addressing our adjustments of it which 
became  necessary  with  an  eye  on  the  financial  crisis.  The  results  of  our  Taylor  rule 
estimations are represented in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The equilibrium real interest rate – conceptual and empirical issues 
The concept of the equilibrium real interest rate which can be traced back to Wicksell 
(1898) has only on a few occasions played a decisive role when estimating Taylor rules. 
Instead,  it  has  simply  been  held  constant  in  most  of  the  studies.
4  This  comes  quite  as  a 
surprise as there is a large strand of literature dealing with variations of this variable over 
time.
5 We start from the basic insight that changes of the equilibrium interest rate can turn out 
to be very large in times of a financial crisis because the standard factors influencing this rate 
tend to be subject to extensive variations as well. That is exactly why we do not feel justified 
to generate the equilibrium real interest rate simply as an trend measure like it was recently 
done, for instance, by Belke/Klose (2009) for normal times because this “leads to substantial 
biases when output or inflation varies significantly” (Wu (2005) p. 1).  
                                                           
4 One noticeable exception is Leigh (2008) who used a framework similar to ours. 
5  See  e.g.  Bomfim  (2001),  Cuaresma/Gnan/Ritzerberger-Gruenwald  (2004)  and  Horváth  (2009)  for  other 
approaches of models with a time varying equilibrium real interest rate. - 2 - 
 
In order to generate a time varying series of the equilibrium real interest rate, we thus 
decided to strictly follow the approach introduced by Laubach/Williams (2003) who used a 
state-space model
6 to estimate this unobservable variable. One additional advantage of this 
approach is that it also treats the potential level of output as an unobserved variable which 
gets estimated within the model. So we do not have to rely on sometimes arbitrary de-trending 
methods to generate a time series of potential output to be used in our Taylor rule estimations. 
We feel legitimized to do so because the state-space approach has been applied in several 
other  studies  to  estimate  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate  for  different  industrialized 
countries.
7 Up to now, however, according to our knowledge, the sample period underlying 
the respective estimations do in no case include the episode of the subprime crisis. 
The model proposed by Laubach/Williams (2003) which we use in order to generate a 
measure of the equilibrium real interest rate consists of the following six equations:  
(1)                                                      
  
  ∑                 
        ,  
(2)               
   
                        
   
                               
                
                  
                                ,  
(3)                
    
      ,  
(4)               ,  
(5)               ,  
(6)               
where    /      stands  for  the  output  and  its  potential,    /     is  the  real  interest  rate  and  its 
equilibrium value,    is the inflation rate,   
  symbols the import price inflation while   
  
displays oil price inflation,    is the annualized growth rate of potential output and    stands 
for additional factors that influence    such as the time preference of the consumers or the 
population growth rate.
8 In this model, equations (1) and (2) represent the measurement or 
signal  equations  while  (3)  to  (5)  are  the  state  equations.  Equation  (6)  describes  the 
                                                           
6 A state-space model consists of signal and state equations. The state equations show how the unobservable 
variables in the system are specified while the signal equations tell us how these variables along with other 
exogenous variables help us to estimate the fitted values of a known variable. 
7 For the US, see also Clark/Kozicki (2005), Trehan/Wu (2006), for the euro area see Wintr/Guarda/Rouabah 
(2005), Mesonnier/Renne (2007), Garnier/Wihelmsen (2008) and for the United Kingdom Larsen/McKeown 
(2004). 
8 The source of the data and their construction are explained in detail in Appendix A.  - 3 - 
 
construction of the equilibrium real interest rate which is essentially derived out of the two 
random walk variables    and   .
9  
We choose the lag structure in line with Laubach/Williams (2003) and in a way such 
that the IS-equation (1) consists of two lags of the output gap and two lags of the real interest 
rate gap, assuming equal weights 
  
  of the latter. For the Phillips curve representation in 
equation (2) we apply eight lags of inflation and one lag of the output gap. The responses to 
the second up to the fourth lag and to the fifth up to the eighth lag of inflation are both 
supposed to be identical and amount to 
   
  , and 
   
  ,respectively. Moreover, the inflation 
coefficients sum up to unity. Our sample period ranges from 1971Q1 to 2009Q2.
10 Hence, the 
former also includes data covering parts of the period of the subprime crisis. 
Since  the  standard  deviations  of  the  trend  growth  rate      and      might  be  biased 
towards zero, due to the so called pile-up-problem
11 (Stock 1994), we cannot estimate the 
above model in a straightforward fashion. Hence, we correct for this by using the median 
unbiased estimator as discussed by Stock/Watson (1998). What is more, we proceed in four 
steps, strictly in line with the suggestions of Laubach/Williams (2003). First, we estimate the 
signal equations separately by OLS using the Hodrick-Prescott-filter (Hodrick/Prescott 1997) 
to generate a series of potential output. In the IS-equation, we omit the real interest rate gap. 
As a second step, we use the Kalman-filter to estimate these signal equations, assuming that 
the trend growth rate is constant. Taking this as a starting point, we are able to compute the 
median unbiased estimate    which is equal to 
  
  
. We use this relationship in a third step and 
add the real interest rate gap to equation (1). We also relax our assumption of a constant trend 
growth rate.  
Taking these considerations as a starting point, we can estimate equations (1) to (5), 
assuming that    being constant.    and    enter the IS-equation by inserting (6) in (1). What 
is  more  and  strictly  in  line  with  Trehan/Wu  (2006),  we  assume  the  Fisher  equation  with 
rational expectations                  to hold. This has the positive side-effect that the real 
                                                           
9 In fact, Laubach and Williams did not restrict the coefficient of the annualized growth rate to unity as we do 
here. But as the estimates of this coefficient in other papers generally turn out to be quite close to one, we feel 
legitimized to do so. 
10 Since data for the most variables of the euro area are only available from the 1990s onwards, we use the Area 
Wide  Model  (AWM)  database  by  Fagan/Henry/Mestre  (2005)  which  is  available  from  the  website  of  the 
European Business Cycle Network and goes back to 1970Q1. The start of our sample period not earlier than in 
1971 is thus due to data construction of the different inflation rates. 
11 In our context, the pile-up-problem occurs since in maximum likelihood estimations the standard deviations of 
   and    are likely to be biased towards zero. The median unbiased estimator corrects for this. - 4 - 
 
interest rate can be calculated within the model since inflation expectations do not need to be 
specified separately. Having estimated these equations, we can compute the median unbiased 





√ . As a final step, we include this relationship in equation (5) and 
estimate the whole system by means of the maximum likelihood estimation method.
12  
We report the corresponding results in Table 1, together with the results of Trehan/Wu 
(2006) for the  US and  Garnier/Wilhelmsen (2009) for the euro area which both serve as 
comparisons and benchmarks for our estimate.  
Table 1 - Estimates of the state-space model: first results 
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    0.023  -  0.055  0.081 
    0.073  -  0.157  0.064 
    0.390  0.57  0.118  0.005 
    0.251  0.80  0.339  0.396 
    0.559  0.46  0.478  0.003 
    0.085  0.20  0.112  0.000 
    0.715  0.22  1.283  - 
                  -170.25  -415.56  -196.64  - 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.  
According to Table 1, it turns out that our estimates are generally in line with those 
gained by a couple of benchmark studies. Additionally, we have generated a time series for 
                                                           
12 We display the whole system written in matrix language in Appendix B. - 5 - 
 
potential  output      ,  its  growth  rate      and  the  additional  factors    .  This  enables  us  to 
calculate a series for the output gap and the equilibrium real interest rate via equation (6). The 
corresponding series for the US and the euro area are displayed in Figure 1.a and 1.b for the 
period from 1998M7 to 2009M6. We have chosen this sample period with an eye on data 
availability and will definitely use it in the next section to estimate the different Taylor rule 
specifications.  
Figure 1.a shows how different the equilibrium real interest rates evolved over time on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In case of the euro area, the equilibrium real interest rate moves 
along the two percentage point benchmark before the crisis. Then it decreases sharply after 
the start of the crisis and becomes even negative in 2008. For the US, in contrast, we find an 
almost steady decrease of the equilibrium real interest rates which is probably a bit more 
pronounced  in  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis.  However,  both  the  euro  area  and  the  US 
equilibrium real interest rate seem to have reached their floor since the end of 2008. Rates are 
no longer declining from this point onwards on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Figure  1.a - Equilibrium real interest rates,    Figure 1.b - Output gap, state-space                         
state-space calculation           calculation 
 
  A closer inspection of Figure 1.b which displays the euro area and US output gap time 
series reveals that both variables move remarkably in parallel with each other, with the US 
output gap throughout taking higher values than its euro area counterpart. However, both 
series display the expected crisis-caused decline in output towards the end of the sample.  
  Having  found  adequate  measures  of  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate  variable  and 
output gap we are now able to estimate Taylor rules separately for the periods before and after 
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Taylor rule in the next section, jointly with possible extensions that might describe the interest 
rate setting of both central banks more accurately in times of financial crisis.  
3. The Taylor Rule and extensions necessitated by the financial crisis 
In 1993 John B. Taylor proposed a new specification of the monetary policy reaction 
function which arguably covered the interest rate setting behavior of the Fed during the period 
1987-1992 quite well. According to his generalized rule, the Fed reacts to deviations of the 
inflation rate from its target and to deviations of the output from its potential, the so-called 
output gap. Hence, we can write the basic Taylor reaction function as follows: 
 (7)                                      
where    is the interest rate set by the Fed,     is the equilibrium real interest rate,    and    
represent the inflation rate and its target,     is the output gap we calculated above and   ,   
are the reaction coefficients to the inflation and output gap respectively. In his seminal paper, 
John B. Taylor sets     and    equal to two and the reaction coefficients equal to 0.5 each. 
With  this  device,  he  is  able  to  mimic  the  interest  rate  setting  of  the  Fed  in  the  above 
mentioned period.  
But  there  is  certainly  a  set  of  additional  variables  (later  on  called  “additional” 
variables) beyond the inflation rate and the output gap which might drive the interest rate 
setting behavior of the Fed and the ECB in times of an exceptional crisis. Following the 
literature, we identified four groups of variables which may be of higher/reduced interest in 
this period.  
The first one is an almost common extension of the Taylor rule not only in times of a 
financial  turmoil.  It  consists  of  expanding  the  rule  by  the  growth  of  a  target  monetary 
aggregate which as usual is M2 in case of the US and is represented by M3 in case of the 
ECB.
13 We expect the sign of this coefficient to be positive, implying that the central banks 
cut rates in response to an increase in money growth because an expansion of the monetary 
base  in  the  long  run  leads  to  inflation  according  to  the  seminal  Friedman  (1963)  view.
14 
However, during a financial crisis the importance of the money growth in an ordinary Taylor 
reaction function should be decreasing since output stabilization typically gets more important 
                                                           
13 See for a complimentary analysis before the subprime crisis Ullrich (2003) or Belke/Polleit (2007). 
14 For the euro area this view is supported by the recent empirical analysis of Hall et al. (2009). - 7 - 
 
than fighting inflation in such a scenario. This should hold especially for the Fed since stable 
prices are just one out of three targets the Fed has to reach in contrast to the ECB where a low 
inflation rate is the primary target. 
The second group of variables covers different measures of credit growth which takes 
into account the hypothesis that within this crisis a credit crunch/rationing is likely to occur.
15 
A credit crunch/rationing is a scenario in which commercial banks cut the amount lent to 
individuals. There are many different reasons for a credit crunch/rationing one can think of. 
But  the  most  pertinent  ones  in  the  ongoing  crisis  are  surely  that  the  value  of  collateral 
decreases and the equity of the banks declines with the decline in asset prices. By the amount 
of credit offered, the capital markets are linked with the real economy. So the rationale behind 
the implementation of this variable is that central banks are trying to overcome the credit 
crunch/rationing by endowing the banks with more liquidity so that they could again raise 
credit and, by this, promote investment and consumption. This is done by lowering interest 
rates, thus pouring additional money into the market to make credit lending work again.  
We  expect  the  estimated  coefficient  to  increase  during  the  crisis  as  it  gets  more 
important than before to provide the economy with the liquidity so urgently needed. In order 
to check whether this fits with US and euro area data, we decided to estimate Taylor rules 
using three different credit measures. First we use overall credit supplied by banks. Second, 
we impose commercial and industrial credit for the Fed and industrial credit for the ECB, 
since  these  measures  are  most  likely  influenced  by  a  potential  credit  crunch  or  credit 
rationing. As a third alternative, we insert real estate credit because the crisis has its roots in 
the housing sector and it is reasonable to assume that in this sector a credit crunch/rationing 
occurred.  
Measuring  increased  risk  in  capital  markets  and  the  associated  change  in  the 
equilibrium interest rate is the goal of a third category of variables inserted by us, i.e. interest 
rate  spreads.
16  During  the  current  crisis  the  focus  in  this  context  switched  towards  the 
Libor/overnight indexed swap (OIS) spread.
17 But unfortunately this spread displayed only 
little variation before the subprime crisis so that the coefficients are estimated imprecisely. 
That is why we do not use this measure in the Taylor rule framework.  
                                                           
15 See Borio/Lowe (2004) for a discussion on the role of credit before the subprime crisis. Christiano et al. 
(2008)  and  Curdia/Woodford  (2009)  show  that  adding  an  aggregate  credit  variable  tends  to  improve  the 
goodness-of-fit of Taylor rule estimates. 
16 See Martin/Milas (2009) for a survey of the usefulness of applying interest rate spreads for an assessment of 
optimal monetary policy in the UK during the subprime crisis. 
17 See, for instance, Taylor (2008), Armatier/Krieger/McAndrews (2008) and Michaud/Upper (2008).  - 8 - 
 
Another interest rate spread which exhibits variation before and after August 2007 is 
the long-term/short-term spread. As short-term rate the 3-month rate is favored and the long-
run rate is those for ten-year treasury/governmental securities. A rising spread signals rising 
risk within the capital market for long-term credits which drive investment decisions. Since 
central banks are generally expected to lower their interest rates in response to a rise in the 
interest  rate  spread,  the  coefficient  of  the  spread  should  be  negative  (Tucker,  2008).  In 
addition, we should expect an even stronger monetary policy reaction throughout the ongoing 
crisis, since reducing the risk in the markets have explicitly been addressed by the authorities 
as a main goal of both the Fed and the ECB policy during this time.
18  
The fourth and last group of potential variables which might be influencing central 
banks’ interest rate setting during the crisis comprises asset price inflation.
19 Here, we focus 
on the two main asset classes housing and stock. As the sharp decline in house prices has 
commonly been regarded as the main trigger of the crisis it seems quite natural to include it 
into our regression analysis. But how does (and should) monetary policy react if house prices 
decline? The answer can be divided into two parts. The first one covers wealth effects by the 
house owners of the houses. The second effect was surely more pronounced in this crisis. It is 
related to the effects on the value of collateral underlying loans and mortgages. If house prices 
fall, the collateral is worth less and higher interest rates would have to be paid in order to have 
access  to  mortgage  financing.  This  finally  results  in  less  credit  given  to  individuals  and 
indicates that central banks should lower interest rates in order to offset the effects induced by 
the loss of collateral. In the same vein, the wealth effect which leads to less consumption 
should be countered by a rate cut in order to enhance consumption. Thus we expect a positive 
sign for this coefficient.  
Considering stock prices, there is also a wealth and collateral effect acting in the same 
way as for house prices. But in addition, there is an effect on the companies issuing stock 
according to Tobin’s q (Tobin 1969) which relates the market capitalization of a firm to its 
replacement costs. If the market capitalization expressed by the cumulative value of stock 
falls in response to a drop in stock prices, q falls and a firm would thus cut investment. The 
response of the central banks to this would be the same as for the other two effects. So we 
                                                           
18 See, for instance, Bernanke (2008) , Mishkin (2009) for the US and Trichet (2009) referring to the ECB. 
19 The debate whether a central bank should respond to asset price changes is all but new. See, for instance, 
Bordo/Jeanne (2002), Checchetti (2003), Detken/Smets (2004), Gruen/Plumb/Stone (2005), De Grauwe (2008) 
or Ahrend/Cournède/Price (2008). For a judgement of ECB representatives concerning the role of asset prices 
see Stark (2009). Cuaresma/Gnan (2008) apply stock price indices as measures of financial instability within 
Taylor rule estimations for the Fed and the ECB and a “pre-crisis” sample period. - 9 - 
 
expect  the  interest  rate  to  fall  if  stock  prices  are  decreasing  thus  leading  to  a  positive 
coefficient of this variable in Taylor rule estimations. Additionally we expect the influence of 
this parameter to have increased in the crisis because it is more likely that the Fed reacts more 
aggressively to a downturn in stock prices than to a steady increase as it was mainly the case 
before the subprime crisis. In the case of the ECB, the effects should be less pronounced since 
financing of the firms in mainly done by receiving credit from banks and much less via the 
capital market (Stark 2009).  
4. Empirical evidence  - Is there a crisis effect on the Taylor rule?  
In this section we present the results of our estimations of the Taylor rule for the Fed 
and the ECB. But, prior to this, we explain our estimation procedure. 
4.1. Estimation issue 
To estimate our different Taylor rule specifications for the US and the euro area, we 
use the GMM procedure. The latter appears highly adequate for our purposes because at the 
time of its interest rate setting decision, the central banks cannot observe the ex-post realized 
right hand side variables. That is why the central banks have to base their decisions on lagged 
values only (Belke/Polleit 2006). We decided to use the first six lags of inflation and the 
output gap and - whenever it is added to the regression equation - the first six lags of the 
“additional” variable as instruments. Moreover, we perform a J-test to test for the validity of 
over-identifying  restrictions  to  check  for  the  appropriateness  of  our  selected  set  of 
instruments. As the relevant weighting matrix we choose, as usual, the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent HAC matrix by Newey and West (1987).  
In order to dispose of enough data-points to catch the dynamics of the interest rate 
setting process during the period of the crisis we decided to use monthly instead of quarterly 
data. Since the equilibrium real interest rate and the output gap estimated in part 2 are of a 
quarterly frequency, they need to be transformed into monthly data. This is done by using a 
cubic spline commonly used to interpolate variables to a higher frequency.
20 The source and 
construction of the transformed variables are explained in Appendix A.  
For estimation purposes we rearrange equation (7) as follows: 
(8)                        1                               
                                                           
20 See for an application of the cubic spline in the context of the Taylor rule Gerdesmeier/Roffia (2005). - 10 - 
 
with       1       such  that,  according  to  the  Taylor  principle,       1.  We  assume  the 
inflation target    to be 2% as suggested by Taylor as well.
21    is a constant term added to 
the  Taylor  rule  which  should  be  zero  cause  all  factors  influencing  this  term  (namely  the 
equilibrium  real  interest  rate  and  the  inflation  target)  are  explicitly  modeled  within  this 
equation. The variable    added in (8) covers the “additional” variables we include in the 
Taylor  rule,  namely:  Money  growth  of  M2  or  M3  (M),  overall  credit  growth  (CR), 
(commercial  and)  industrial  credit  growth  (CR_(COMM)_IND),  real  estate  credit  growth 
(CR_HOUSE), the interest rate gap (I), stock price inflation (S) and house price inflation 
(HP).    covers the error term.  
In order to account for the claim raised by Mishkin (2008 and 2009) that monetary 
policy is less inertial during a financial crisis we also implemented an interest rate smoothing 
term  into  equation  (8).  Hence,  the  specification  of  the  monetary  policy  reaction  function 
changes to: 
(9)         ·         1      ·                   1                          +  , 
where   is the smoothing parameter taking reasonable values between zero (the interest rate is 
only driven by the fundamentals in the Taylor rule and not by the lagged interest rate) to one 
(the lagged interest rate is the best predictor for the contemporaneous interest rate). If Mishkin 
is right, we expect the interest rate smoothing parameter to fall significantly within the crisis.  
 4.2. Estimation Results  
  In  order  to  estimate  whether  there  is  a  change  in  the  Fed  and  the  ECB  estimated 
reaction function coefficients with the beginning of the subprime crisis, we divide our sample 
period into two subsamples. The first one covers the period before the subprime crisis started. 
As the “pre-crisis” period we choose 1999M1-2007M1. Although the start is normally dated 
to August 2007
22 we did not make use of the data ranging from 2007M2 to 2007M7 in order 
to avoid that any economic indicators which already indicate an upcoming crisis are included 
                                                           
21 Although an inflation target of 2% percent is not explicitly announced by the Fed like the ECB does, it is 
widely accepted as an inflation target corresponding to price stability without running the risk of deflation. 
22 See e.g. Cecchetti (2008) pp. 12-17, Taylor/Williams (2009) p. 60. For a detailed schedule what happened 
around that time and the decisions made by the most important central banks as a reaction to this see Bank for 
International Settlement (2008) pp. 56-74. They should not be repeated here. - 11 - 
 
in  the  estimations  for  the  “pre-crisis”  sample.  For  our  “subprime”  estimation  we  use  the 
period 2007M8 to 2009M6, due to data constraints.
23  
4.2.1 Results for basic specifications 
The Fed Taylor rule 
In Table 2  we present the results of  equation (8) for the  Fed, i.e. the  Taylor rule 
without interest rate smoothing based on a sample period which excludes the subprime crisis.  
Table 2 - Taylor rule estimates for the Fed - the “pre-crisis” period 
  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8 


















































      0.16*** 
(0.04)             
         -0.03 
(0.03)           
   _    _           0.22*** 
(0.03)         
   _               -0.04* 
(0.02)       
              -0.85*** 
(0.09)     
                -0.021*** 
(0.004)   
                   -0.18*** 
(0.03) 
        0.63  0.54  0.61  0.85  0.60  0.87  0.61  0.82 
















Notes: GMM estimates, */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, standard errors in parentheses, 
for the J-statistic we put p-value in parentheses; abbreviations of the regressors follow those of Appendix A; 
Sample 1999M1-2007M1.    
Table 2 reveals that the Taylor principle, i.e. the assumption of an inflation coefficient 
   above unity, is violated in all but one (column 2.8) cases considered. Thus, we do not find 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that an increase in the inflation rate is offset by an even 
larger increase in the nominal interest rate (which would then lead to a rise in the real rate). 
The estimated output gap coefficient    is on average larger than the proposed 0.5, often even 
exceeding  unity.  However,  there  are  two  exceptions,  i.e.  an  output  gap  coefficient  below 
                                                           
23 For the euro area house price inflation only data up to 2008M12 are available, which were provided by 
Andreas Rees. So the results rely on this shorter period. Additionally we use only the first four lags of the 
variables as instruments in order to have enough degrees of freedom left. - 12 - 
 
unity: when adding consumer and industrial credit growth (column 2.4) and the interest rate 
gap  (column  2.6)  to  the  previous  specification.  In  these  estimations  both  estimated 
coefficients of the output gap turn out to be much smaller and are insignificant in one case. 
But  this  does  not  come  as  a  surprise  as  a  brief  look  at  the  data  reveals  that 
consumer/industrial credit growth and the interest rate gap exhibit the closest (positive and 
negative) correlation with the Fed Funds Rate. Hence, it appears rather unlikely that inflation 
and the output gap variables included in our specification of the Taylor rule are estimated with 
the necessary precision. However, both “additional” variables are highly significant and the 
goodness-of-fit as measured by the adjusted   
2 is larger than for the “normal” Taylor rule. 
What is more, an equally good fit can also be found for the specification adding house price 
inflation (2.8) where the inflation and output gap parameter does not fall. 
Seen  on  the  whole,  we  consistently  find  significant  results  for  the  “additional” 
variables with the exception of overall credit growth (column 2.3). This result might be driven 
be the opposing signs of commercial and industrial (column 2.4) to housing credit growth 
(2.5). While the prior shows the expected positive sign the latter points to a weakly significant 
negative reaction. Also the signs of the estimated coefficients of money growth (column 2.2) 
and of the interest rate gap (column 2.6) are in line with theory and significantly different 
from zero. In contrast to that we find a significantly negative response of the interest rate to 
asset price inflation expressed in terms of stock price inflation (column 2.7) and house price 
inflation (column 2.8). This suggests that the Fed even triggered bubbles in these sectors 
which in the end fueled the financial crisis.  
After having assessed the goodness-of-fit of the Taylor rule in the “pre-crisis” period, 
we now turn to an estimation of the coefficients of this rule across the financial crisis and 
compare these coefficients with those gained from the estimation for the “pre-crisis” period. 
The corresponding results for the Fed are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3 reveals that the inflation coefficient which turns out to be rather low already in 
the  pre-crisis  era  even  decreases  in  magnitude  further  now.  In  most  cases,  the  estimated 
coefficient  stays  significant  but  turns  negative,  indicating  that  the  Fed  reacts  to  a  rise  in 
inflation by a reduction in the policy rate which is clearly at odds with the recommendations 
of the “normal” Taylor rule. However, this pattern might be driven by the period up to the 
mid-2008 in which inflation increased sharply in response to the worldwide rise in oil prices 
while the interest rate was already declining. Afterwards, inflation declined at a rapid pace as - 13 - 
 
well. Nevertheless it is evident that at least in the first year of the crisis the Fed did the 
opposite  of  what  it  should  have  done  according  to  the  guiding  lines  of  the  Taylor  rule 
regarding the inflation response.  
Table 3 - Taylor rule estimates for the Fed – the “subprime” period 
  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.7  3.8 


















































      -0.72*** 
(0.03)             
         -0.40*** 
(0.03)           
   _    _           -0.15*** 
(0.00)         
   _               -0.23*** 
(0.02)       
              -0.93*** 
(0.01)     
                0.055*** 
(0.001)   
                   0.19*** 
(0.00) 
        0.85  0.94  0.89  0.99  0.88  0.95  0.94  0.99 
















Notes: GMM estimates, */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, standard errors in parentheses, 
for the J-statistic we put the p-value in parentheses; abbreviations of the regressors follow those of Appendix A; 
Sample 2007M8-2009M6. 
  Remarkably,  the  estimated  reaction  of  the  interest  rate  to  the  output  gap  remains 
positive and highly significant across all specifications. However, the coefficient estimates 
differ in magnitude by almost 1.5, depending on the specification chosen. Compared to the 
“pre-crisis” estimates, no clear-cut picture emerges with respect to the question whether the 
impact of the output gap has really changed. In most cases the magnitude of the estimated 
output  gap  coefficient  decreases.  However,  only  for  the  specifications  including  money 
growth (just comparing column 2.2 to column 3.2), all credit growth measures (columns 2.3 
to 2.5 with columns 3.3 to 3.5) or asset price inflation (columns 2.7 to 2.8 with columns 3.7 to 
3.8) we find a significant difference between the coefficients estimated in both subsamples.
24 
While the influence of the output gap decreases in case of the specifications including money 
growth and asset price inflation (columns 3.2, 3.7, 3.8), the opposite is true in case of the 
                                                           
24  We used the Wald-test in order to assess the significance of the differences between both coefficients. - 14 - 
 
Taylor rule specifications including commercial and industrial and real estate credit growth 
(columns 3.3 to 3.5).  
  Turning  now  to  the  “additional”  variables,  some  remarkable  differences  are  worth 
mentioning.  Except  for  the  interest  rate  spread-adjusted  rule  (column  3.6),  where  the 
estimated coefficient    stays almost unchanged after the start of the financial crisis period 
(indicating that the Fed did and does give equal weight to interest rate gaps), the estimated 
coefficients of all other variables change their sign and remain significant.
25 The impact of 
money growth (column 3.2) turns negative which corresponds with theory since in a crisis 
stabilizing the economy is more important than fighting future inflation.  
The negative sign of our estimated credit growth coefficients (columns 3.3 to 3.5) is 
somehow  surprising.  Strictly  speaking,  this  means  that  the  Fed  has  responded  to  a  credit 
growth decline with a rise in interest rates. However, such a result appears counter-intuitive 
since the literature seems to claim that the sign should be positive. For instance, some have 
suggested that because of imperfections in financial intermediation, it is more important for 
central banks to monitor and respond to variations in the volume of bank lending than would 
be the case if the frictionless financial markets of Arrow-Debreu theory were more nearly 
descriptive of reality. A common recommendation in this vein is that monetary policy should 
be  used  to  help  to  stabilize  aggregate  private  credit,  by  tightening  policy  when  credit  is 
observed to grow unusually strongly and loosening policy when credit is observed to contract.  
For example, Christiano et al. (2007) propose that a Taylor rule that is adjusted in 
response to variations in aggregate credit may represent an improvement upon an unadjusted 
Taylor  rule.  But  according  to  Curdia/Woodford  (2009),  pp.  39ff.,  the  optimal  degree  of 
response to a reduction in credit is much less strong than would be required to fully stabilize 
aggregate credit at some target level, especially if there are financial frictions as in the current 
crisis. Like us, they find an optimally negative response to their calibrated aggregate credit 
coefficient for example to a governmental debt shock.  
Moreover,  we  have  to  differentiate  between  credit  rationing  and  a  credit  crunch. 
Whereas under a credit crunch the market mechanism still works in the sense that interest rate 
adjustments bring supply of and demand for loans in equilibrium, credit rationing implies an 
                                                           
25 However, there are two exceptions. The specification including overall and housing credit growth had an (in-) 
significantly negative influence before Subprime. Within the crisis it turns significantly negative and the Wald 
test indicates a significantly drop in the response coefficient, thus the picture for credit growth measures is not 
changed by this result. - 15 - 
 
equilibrium in which there is an excess demand for loans over credit supply (Green/Oh 1991). 
If there is credit rationing, the interest rate has to increase in order to reduce credit demand 
and expand credit supply to a new market equilibrium. Thus, our results imply that the Fed 
judges the reduced credit growth as a malfunctioning of the market (credit rationing).  
Finally, the negative coefficient can simply be explained by the minor importance of 
US credit markets in refinancing of companies. Since it is most likely that the focus of the Fed 
is to avoid bankruptcy of companies, it becomes evident that this is not achieved via the credit 
market but through other means for example through stock prices.  
In contrast to the estimations for the “pre-crisis” period, the estimated coefficients of 
asset price inflation (columns 3.7 to 3.8) display the expected positive sign. This is compatible 
with the view that during the financial crisis the Fed reacted to the downturn in asset prices 
with a reduction in the policy rate. This, in turn, suggests that the Fed reacts to movements in 
asset prices in an asymmetric fashion, i.e. stronger to a downturn than to an increase of asset 
prices, since we find an accommodative policy towards asset price inflation in our estimations 
for the “pre-crisis” period (columns 2.7 to 2.8).  
The ECB Taylor rule 
Turning now to the Taylor rule estimations for the ECB we display our results for the 
pre-crisis episode in Table 4. The results show that - as in the case of the Fed - the Taylor 
principle is never fulfilled. Additionally, the reaction coefficients of the output gap all take 
values of around one, thus being in line with those found for the Fed in Table 2. Hence, as far 
as the Taylor rule coefficients of inflation and the output gap are concerned both central banks 
seem to have followed a rather similar policy before the crisis hit. 
However, we find some differences when looking at the “additional” variables. The 
coefficients  of  money  growth  (column  4.2)  and  stock  price  inflation  (column  4.7)  are 
insignificant in contrast to the Fed estimates (columns 2.2 and 2.7). For money growth this 
result is surprising since the ECB explicitly announced a prominent role to this measure. But 
we  get  a  clearer  picture  of  the  ECB’s  reaction  to  credit  growth  (columns  4.3  to  4.5)  as 
compared to the Fed since all three measures show a small but significantly positive reaction. 
This result is not surprising since credit markets in the euro area play a much bigger role in 
financing corporations than in the US (Stark 2009). The interest rate gap (column 4.6) and the 
house price inflation variable (column 4.8) exhibit a negative response coefficient as is also 
the case for the Fed (columns 2.6 and 2.8).  - 16 - 
 
Table 4 - Taylor rule estimates for the ECB - the “pre-crisis” period 
  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4  4.5  4.6  4.7  4.8 


















































      -0.01 
(0.03)             
         0.03*** 
(0.00)           
   _           0.06*** 
(0.01)         
   _               0.12*** 
(0.02)       
              -0.44*** 
(0.03)     
                -0.001 
(0.002)   
                   -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
        0.82  0.82  0.93  0.95  0.94  0.96  0.78  0.84 
















Notes: GMM estimates, */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, standard errors in parentheses, 
for the J-statistic we put p-value in parentheses; abbreviations of the regressors follow those of Appendix A; 
Sample 1999M1-2007M1.    
  In order to check whether there has been a change in behavior of the ECB in the wake 
of the financial crisis, we have to compare the results of Table 4 to those of the estimates for 
the  time  after  2007M8.  For  this  purpose,  we  display  the  results  for  the  ECB  during  the 
subprime crisis in Table 5. 
We  find  a  significant  increase  vis-à-vis  the  “pre-crisis”  period  in  the  response  to 
inflation in all specifications except for column 5.8 where the inflation coefficient also grows 
but the difference to column 4.8 is insignificant according to our Wald-tests. Whereas the 
inflation coefficient rises, the output gap coefficient drops within the crisis period. There is 
evidence that the ECB now even puts a significant negative weight on the output gap. For 
instance, this pattern even might indicate that in times of a crisis the ECB goes back to its 
mandate of fighting inflation as its preponderant goal.  
  Referring  now  to  the  “additional”  variables,  we  find  always  highly  significant 
estimates, as was also the case for the Fed in the “crisis period”. However, the sign and the 
magnitude of the responses differ in some cases from their empirical realizations before the 
crisis.  For  the  credit  measures  (columns  4.3  to  4.5/5.3  to  5.5)  we  now  find  a  significant 
increase, implying that the ECB reacts to the reduced credit growth with even stronger cuts in - 17 - 
 
the interest rate in contrast to the pre-crisis era where this reaction was less pronounced. This 
empirical finding is compatible with the view that the ECB tends to classify the reduced credit 
growth as a credit crunch rather than credit rationing. Remember that, on the contrary and 
according to our results in Table 3, the Fed appears to follow the interpretation of a credit 
rationing  (columns  3.3  to  3.5).  This  finding  is  supported  by  the  quote  of  ECB-president 
Trichet (2009) that “results do not point to a severe rationing of credit, although […] surveys 
of banks indicate that credit standards have been tightened”. 
Table 5 - Taylor rule estimates for the ECB – the “subprime” period 
  5.1  5.2  5.3  5.4  5.5  5.6  5.7  5.8 


















































      -0.09* 
(0.04)             
         0.05*** 
(0.01)           
   _           0.27*** 
(0.01)         
   _               0.24*** 
(0.02)       
              -0.63*** 
(0.02)     
                -0.011*** 
(0.001)   
                   0.26*** 
(0.02) 
        0.91  0.92  0.91  0.95  0.92  0.97  0.87  0.45 
















Notes: GMM estimates, */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, standard errors in parentheses, 
for the J-statistic we put the p-value in parentheses; abbreviations of the regressors follow those of Appendix A; 
Sample 2007M8-2009M6.  
For  stock  price  inflation  (columns  4.7  and  5.7)  we  find  a  significantly  negative 
estimated response coefficient. Hence, within the crisis the ECB seems to react to lower stock 
price  inflation  by  increasing  the  policy  rate.  This  result  may  be  explained  by  the  minor 
importance of the stock market in the euro area compared to the US where we found indeed a 
significantly positive coefficient of stock price inflation in the “crisis period” as opposed to a 
negative coefficient in the “pre-crisis” period (columns 2.7 and 3.7).  
In contrast to stock prices, including house price inflation (columns 4.8 and 5.8) leads 
to the same conclusion as for the Fed, i.e. a significantly negative impact in the “pre-crisis” 
period and a significantly positive impact in the “crisis” period (columns 2.8 and 3.8). While - 18 - 
 
the ECB even accommodated house price inflation before the crisis, they actively tackle this 
measure in the downturn.  
   The  negative  reaction  to  the  interest  rate  spread  increases  significantly  within  the 
crisis as we have expected it from theory (columns 4.6 and 5.6). However, the reaction is less 
pronounced than the one of the Fed in both periods (columns 2.6 and 3.6). Concerning money 
growth  (columns  4.1  and  5.1)  we  are  not  able  to  find  any  significant  difference  of  the 
estimates between the “pre-crisis” and the “crisis” period. 
4.2.2 Testing for different degrees of interest rate smoothing before and after the start of 
the crisis 
  A final comparison enacted by us refers to the question whether the Fed and the ECB 
react less inertially during a crisis such as the subprime crisis as, for instance, suggested by 
Mishkin (2008, 2009). Therefore we insert an interest rate smoothing term into the regression 
equations and compare the interest rate smoothing parameter ( ) in equation (9) for the two 
sample periods and central banks. We display our results in Table 6. However, in contrast to 
the preceding sections we refrain from drawing any conclusions with respect to the Taylor 
rule coefficients from these estimates since comparisons of these estimates might be biased by 
different degrees of interest rate smoothing. That is why we do not explicitly display the 
estimated Taylor rule coefficients (except the smoothing term) in Table 6.
26  
Both central banks are characterized by a high degree of interest rate smoothing in the pre-
crisis era. For the Fed there is only one specification where we find a smoothing coefficient of 
less than 0.95. Although the coefficients are on average not that large for the ECB there are 
still only three specifications with a smoothing coefficient of even less than 0.94. However, in 
the case of the ECB there is one outlier (0.38 in column 3, row 6). Nevertheless, we can 
conclude that before the subprime crisis the past interest rate was the best predictor for the 
present interest rate. 
When looking at the crisis period, we find a significant decrease for the Fed in four out 
of eight specifications. This decrease is especially pronounced for the Taylor rules including 
commercial and industrial credit growth and house price inflation. But we are unable to detect 
a significant decrease in the Taylor rule without any “additional” variables which appears to 
be against the intuition of Mishkin (2008, 2009). 
                                                           
26 However, the results are available from the authors upon request. - 19 - 
 
Table 6 - Estimated interest rate smoothing terms in Taylor rules for the Fed and the ECB 
  Fed  ECB 
 Pre-Crisis  Crisis   Pre-Crisis  Crisis 




































































Notes: GMM estimates, */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level, standard errors in parenthesis; TR = standard 
Taylor  rule,  remaining  abbreviations  indicate  additional  included  variables  in  the  Taylor  rule  as  they  are  introduced  in 
Appendix A. 
For the ECB we even find in six out of eight specifications a significant decrease in 
the interest rate smoothing term as compared to the “pre-crisis” period. However, we also 
estimated a significant increase in the specification including industrial credit growth in which 
the coefficient within the crisis even exceeds unity. But since all other specifications point to 
a decrease in the degree of interest rate smoothing, our results support the view that the ECB 
and the Fed behaved according to the Mishkin principle, i.e. that they should behave less 
inertially during the financial crisis.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that the response of the Fed and the ECB to economic 
fundamentals, which are likely to have changed within the crisis starting in 2007, differs 
considerably. We use a Taylor rule specification including two explicitly modeled unobserved 
variables, i.e. the equilibrium real interest rate and potential output, which are estimated with 
a state-space approach. By means of this specific approach we are able to show that reaction 
coefficients for the two central banks differed only to a little extent before the crisis started. 
However, within the crisis the ECB tends to go back to its mandate of fighting consumer price 
inflation at the cost of some output losses. The Fed acts the other way round by promoting 
output and putting a smaller weight on suppressing consumer price inflation.  - 20 - 
 
When it comes to the inclusion of “additional” variables we find a significant decrease 
in the Fed reaction to money growth in line with the less pronounced role of fighting inflation, 
while  the  reaction  to  this  measure  has  not  changed  significantly  for  the  ECB  which  is 
surprising because this result also leads to a less forward looking behavior of ECB concerning 
future inflation.  
For the credit measures we observe a complete different reaction of both central banks. 
While the Fed reacts significantly negative to credit growth which is rational when there is 
credit rationing rather than a credit crunch the reverse is true for the ECB. This can also be 
explained by the larger importance of credit markets in the euro area than in the US. In the 
euro area credits are the most common refinancing opportunity for companies thus a credit 
crunch would have larger effects in these economy than in one where refinancing is done to a 
large extend by issuing stock like in the US.  
This differing reactions can also be seen when looking at the change in the reaction to 
stock price inflation. While the Fed formerly even accommodated stock price inflation in the 
downturn stock price disflation is tackled actively while the ECB in the pre-crisis era did not 
react to this measure at all and within the crisis responds even negative. However, for the 
other asset price class observed within this paper, house price inflation, we find the same 
significant reaction for both central banks. They seem to have accommodated inflation of this 
kind before the crisis hit and fight it since the beginning of the subprime crisis actively.  
For the last “additional” variable, the interest rate gap, we find for both central banks 
the expected negative response in all periods. Thus both have ever since reacted actively to 
risks in capital markets. 
Besides  all  the  differences  mentioned  above  we  were  also  able  to  show  that  both 
central banks react less inertial to fundamentals within the crisis according to the Mishkin 
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Appendix A: Data sources 
A.1.a: Real equilibrium interest rate (USA) 
Variable  Measure  Source 
output  GDP  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
interest rate  federal funds rate  OECD 
inflation rate 
year-on-year change in the 
personal consumption 
expenditure (PCE) price 
index (excluding food and 
energy) 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
import price inflation 
(nonpetroleum) 
year-on-year change of the 
price index for imports of 
nonpetroleum products 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
import price inflation 
(petroleum) 
year-on-year change in the 
price index for imports of 
petroleum and petroleum 
products  
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
 
A.2.a: Taylor rules (USA) 
Variable  Measure  Source 
interest rate (i_us)  federal funds rate  OECD 
inflation (π_us)  year-on-year change in 
consumer price index  OECD 
output-gap (Y_us) 
GDP subtracted by potential 
GDP calculated by         
state-space estimate 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, OECD 
money growth (M_us)  year-on-year change in 
monetary aggregate M2  OECD 
credit growth (CR_us)  year-on-year change in 
overall bank credit  Federal Reserve 
commercial and industrial 
credit growth 
(CR_COMM_IND_us) 
year-on-year change in 
commercial and industrial 
loans 
Federal Reserve 
house credit growth 
(CR_HOUSE_us) 
year-on-year change in real 
estate loans  Federal Reserve 
interest rate spread (I_us) 
difference 10 year treasury 
securities yields and            
3-months yields  
Federal Reserve 
stock price growth (S_us) 
year-on-year change in an 
index of all common stock 
listed on the NYSE 
OECD 
house price growth (HP_us) 
year-on-year growth of the 
S&P/Case-Shiller home price 
index 
Standard and Poor’s 
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A.1.b: Real equilibrium interest rate (euro area) 
Variable  Measure  Source 
output  GDP  ECB, AWM 
interest rate  Eonia  ECB, AWM 
inflation rate  year-on-year change in the 
HICP  ECB, AWM 
import price inflation   year-on-year change in the 
import price deflator  ECB, AWM 
oil price inflation  year-on-year change in oil 
prices  ECB, AWM 
 
A.2.b: Taylor rules (euro area) 
Variable  Measure  Source 
interest rate (i_ea)  Eonia  ECB 
inflation (π_ea)  year-on-year change in the 
HICP  ECB 
output gap (Y_ea) 
GDP subtracted by potential 
GDP calculated by         
state-space estimate 
ECB 
money growth (M_ea)  year-on-year change in 
monetary aggregate M3  ECB 
credit growth (CR_ea)  year-on-year change in 
overall bank credit  ECB 
industrial credit growth  
(CR_ IND_ea) 
year-on-year change in 
industrial loans  ECB 
house credit growth 
(CR_HOUSE_ea) 
year-on-year change in real 
estate loans  ECB 
interest rate spread (I_ea) 
difference 10 year 
government bond yields and 
3-month Euribor  
ECB 
stock price growth (S_ea) 
year-on-year change in the 
Dow Jones EURO STOXX 
index  
OECD 
house price growth (HP_ea)  year-on-year growth of the 
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Appendix B: State-Space model 
The signal equations are given by (see (1) and (2)): 
(A.1)                   
   
                        
   
                              
                              
                  
                                ,  
(A.2)                                                          
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Inserting (6) and using the Fisher equation with rational expectations yields: 
(A.2.1)                                                       
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                                                          ,  
Using the Phillips curve representation (A.1) in the IS-equation (A.2.1) and some rearranging 
leads to: 
(A.2.2)                   
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So the Model can be written as: 
(A.3)    
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